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I. INTRODUCTION
China is, by some accounts, the largest emerging market in the world! As
such, it has attracted investors from many developed countries? In the United
States, the government encourages businesses to seek out opportunities in China
in an effort to help the U.S. economy and to promote foreign policy interests in

1. See Joe Palca, China Appears to be a Burgeoning Consumer Market (National Public Radio, All
Things Considered radio broadcast, Feb. 18, 1995) (recognizing the lucrative consumer market in China as
determined by a scientific poll); see also U.S. Dep't of Commerce Office of Pub. Affairs, SecretaryBrown
Leads PresidentialBusiness DevelopmentMission of CEOsto Chinaand Hong Kong,August 27-September
3, 1994-FirstCabinet-Level Visit SinceAdministrationMFNfDecisionInitiatesNew U.S.-China Commercial
Era,U.S. DEP'T op CoMMERcE NEws, Aug. 17, 1994 (emphasizing the importance of the world's fastest
growing economy, namely China, to the growth of the U.S. economy).
2. See Gary I. Dernelle, Note, DirectForeignInvestment andContractualRelations in the People's
Republic of China, 6 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 331, 331-32 (1994) (outlining the explosion in direct foreign
investment in China since 1979). Until 1978, direct foreign investment in the PRC was not permitted. Id.
However, from 1979-1986,7500 contracts with foreign investors were signed totaling approximately US$19.1
billion. Id. See also Marcus W. Brauchli, China'sEconomicRole in Asia is Burgeoning,WAML ST. J., July 24,
1995 (noting that in 1994, investments pouring into China totaled nearly US$34 billion).
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China. As a result of an August 1994 trip to China by U.S. Commerce Secretary
Brown and several CEOs of U.S. corporations,4 some U.S. firms and their
Chinese counterparts signed several contracts to provide goods and services and
also entered into several joint ventures 5 Undoubtedly, before seeking opportunities in China, other U.S. companies will measure the success of those who
have already invested in China and analyze all foreseeable commercial and
political risks associated with their investments.6 In making investment decisions,
these companies will consider the degree of protection afforded to debtors and
creditors under China's bankruptcy system. Moreover, firms currently doing
business in Hong Kong may find information concerning the bankruptcy laws in
China useful, given the upcoming reversion of Hong Kong to China in 1997.8
U.S. firms providing goods or services to existing state-owned enterprises or

3.
U.S. DEP'TOFCOMMEmcENEwS. Aug. 17. 1994, supranote I. See Mike Shuster, ClintonAins at
InternationalEconomic Policy- PartI (National Public Radio, Morning Edition radio broadcast, Feb. 20.
1995); Mike Shuster, ClintonAims at InternationalEconomic Policy - PartII (National Public Radio, Morning
Edition radio broadcast. Feb. 21, 1995) (describing the Clinton administration's desire to pursue large emerging

markets).
4.
U.S. DEP'TOFCOmmERCENEws, Aug. 17, 1994,supranote 1.
5.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Commerce Office of Pub. Affairs, Member of U.S. PresidentialBusiness
Development Mission Announces Major Agreement with Ministry of Post and Telecommunications to
Modernize China'sPostalSystem, U.S. DE"ToFCmaRcENsws, Aug.29, 1994; U.S. Dcp't of Commcrce
Office of Pub. Affairs, WestinghouseAnnounces Major Contractfor Chinese PowerPlantDuring Presidential
Business Development Mission, U.S. DEP'T0F COMMERCE NEws, Aug. 29, 1994; U.S. Dep't of Commerce
Office of Pub. Affairs, MajorAgreementsReachedDuringBrown Trade Mission Advance U.S. Commercial
Interests in China, U.S. DEP'TOFCOmmERCE NEWS, Sept. 2, 1994. See also infra notes 9-10 (describing the
type of agreements reached and the joint ventures entered into between U.S. and Chinese companies).
6.
See Robert B. Shanks, ProtectingInvestments in China, in LEGAL ASPECTS Op DOING BUSINESs
wrrn CHmA 1986,389 (1986) (describing elements of political and commercial risks of investing in China).
An investor minimizes these risks using mechanisms such as: (1) commercial or financial devices; (2)
negotiation and skillful drafting of contracts and other legal documents, including choice of law and dispute
resolution provisions; and (3) insurance or guaranties. Id. Because of the pervasive role of the Chinese
government in commercial enterprises, commercial and political risk are highly interrelated. Id.; Demelle,
supra note 2, at 340 (stating that foreign investment in China remains risky for investors unfamiliar with
China's evolving legal system and economic past). See generally Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S.
Investments in China: Chimera of Protectlionand Predictability?,34 VA.J. ITr'L L. 615 (1994).
7.
See Shanks, supranote 6. at 389 (determining that an effective and well defined bankruptcy system
exemplifies a commercial practice which helps minimize political risk); Foe Choy Peng, Bankruptcy Law to
SpeedReform, S. CHiAMoNIG POST, Dec. 30,1994, at 5 (emphasizing that enforcement of bankruptcy law
enhances an enterprise's awareness of risk and that China's bankruptcy law should incorporate overseas
experience and international practice). Thus, a U.S. business should determine how any claim regarding its
investment is likely to fare under the Chinese legal regime. Richard C. Breeden, The Globalizationof Law nad
Business in the 1990's, 28 WAKEFOREST L.REV. 509, 515 (1993).
8.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to forecast what exactly will be the effect of China's
absorption of Hong Kong on insolvency procedures currently practiced. Because the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone adjoins Hong Kong and was created especially with Hong Kong in mind, it is instructive to
study bankruptcy law in Shenzhen. See infra notes 128-153 and accompanying text (analyzing provisions under
the Shenzhen Rules).
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private businesses in China may become creditors. 9 U.S. corporations creating or
becoming part of a wholly-owned enterprise or entering into a joint venture, may

become debtors if the business fails.' ° Whether as a debtor or creditor, it is
important that U.S. businesses become aware of the intricacies of Chinese bank-

ruptcy law.

Bankruptcy law has been slow to develop in China. 2 In August 1986, the
13
Shenyang Explosion-Proof Equipment Factory in Shenyang became bankrupt.
This was the first declared bankruptcy since the 1949 Communist takeover. 4 The
first failure of a foreign-owned enterprise took place in Shenzhen in October 1983

when the LMK Nam Sang Dyeing Factory collapsed.' 5 It was the first whollyowned foreign enterprise established in the People's Republic of China (PRC)
and the insolvency was not handled as a formalized bankruptcy. 6 Prior to these

9. See, e.g.,U.S.DEP'TOFCMMERCENEws, Sept. 2,1994, supranote 5 (announcing agreements to
provide goods and services between U.S. and Chinese companies). For example, Pitney Bowes will sell postal
processing equipment; TRW agreed to provide cable TV descramblers; Westinghouse will manufacture steam
turbine generators and related power plant equipment; and AT&T will provide telecommunications equipment.
Id. If any of these companies perform according to the agreement and do not receive payment because the other
party has become insolvent, the U.S. firm would become a creditor having a claim in bankruptcy.
10. See, eg., id. (announcing joint venture agreements between U.S. and Chinese companies). IBM and
i Tong Communication Co. will jointly develop data and consumer credit card networks and General Electric
will install and operate turbine generators in a power plant jointly with Shanghai Municipal Electric Power
Corp. Id. These joint ventures, and derivatively the U.S. firm as a part owner, could become debtors if the
enterprise's liabilities overcome its assets.
11. See Breeden, supra note 7, at 515 (noting that investment managers analyze the legal systems of
national economies and that bankruptcy law is a variable which helps determine the attractiveness of an
investment, thus influencing investment patterns).
12. The Qing dynasty enacted China's first bankruptcy law (pochan hi) in 1906. Peng Xiaohua,
Characteristics of China's FirstBankruptcy Law, 28 HARV. INT'L L.i. 373, 373 n.1 (1987). Later, the

Kuomintang (Republican, "Nationalist" Chinese) government passed a bankruptcy law in 1935. Id. The
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China enact all civil laws
in China. Id. The current bankruptcy laws were initiated in the 1980s and are still being implemented. Id. The
Chinese legal system is purely statutory, with no officially reported cases and, hence, no case law. Dernelle,
supra note 2, at 331 n.I. The Finance and Economics Committee under the National People's Congress is
responsible for bankruptcy legislation. Foo Choy Peng, supranote 7, at 5. Although many Chinese laws touch
some of the peripheral aspects of bankruptcy (e.g., laws on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, on Wholly
Foreign-Owned Enterprises, the Civil Procedure Law, the Company Law of the People's Republic of China),
this comment focuses on the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the Shenzhen Rules. See Flaxer, infra note 60
(mentioning the impact of the other laws on bankruptcy). See also infra notes 64-113 (discussing the Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law) and notes 128-153 (discussing the Shenzhen Rules) and accompanying text:
13.

Michael Minor & Karen J. Stevens-Minor, China'sEmerging Bankruptcy Law, 22 INT'L LAW.

1217,1218(1988).
14. Id.
15. Steven L. Toronto, Bankruptcy ofForeignEnterprisesin the PRC:An Interpretationof the "Rules
ConcerningBankruptcy of ForeignRelated Companiesin the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone," 4J.CIUNESE
L. 277,277 (1990).
16. Id. The factory was a subsidiary operated by a Hong Kong holding company already in receivership.
Id. The authorities in Shenzhen negotiated with Peat Marwick, the receiver appointed by the Hong Kong court.
Id. Peat Marwick ultimately gained possession of the factory and liquidated its assets. Id. At the time,
bankruptcy laws had not been passed. rd.Thus, it was simply a matter of negotiation. Id.
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events, the Chinese economy was unprepared for business failure because of the
inadequate development of bankruptcy laws.
This comment assesses the current state of bankruptcy law in China. Part II
examines the reluctance by the Chinese Government and other actors to initiate
bankruptcy proceedings and, hence, to enforce established bankruptcy laws. 17Part
III explores the basic provisions of existing bankruptcy law in China. 8 Part IV
relates recent developments in Chinese bankruptcy, 9 while Part V discusses
possible strategies for U.S. businesses suggested by the structure and enforcement
of the bankruptcy lawsYo
II. WHY HAVE BANKRUPTCY LAWS TAKEN So LONG TO DEVELOP?
The concept of establishing and applying bankruptcy laws has been vexing
for the PRC. The basic Communist model of a command economy with stateowned enterprises rejects the notion of business failure because, at least theoretically, business failure only happens in a capitalist economy.2 ' Insolvency of
a state-owned business is also unpalatable for the government, as this implies
improper management by the state, not the managers of the enterprise? 2 But as
the PRC moves to the political principle of Deng Xiaoping, "one country, two
systems,"' 3 a tenet which allows private as well as state-owned enterprises to
operate in China, the necessity for a method to deal with business insolvency
grows.

17. See infranotes 21-51 and accompanying text.
18. See infranotes 52-153 and accompanying text.
19. See infranotes 154-174 and accompanying text.
20. See infranotes 175-191 and accompanying text.
21. Minor, supra note 13, at 1217. See Richard J. Goossen, China'sBankruptcy Law: Taking Legal
Reform to the Next Level, E. AsiANExECtrnvEREP., July 15, 1987 (noting that the government in the Maoist

era suppressed individual economic responsibility as a trademark of a capitalistic society).
22. Minor, supra note 13, at 1217.
23. RoBERTKL BERG, CHiNA'S "OPEmNNG"ToT-mOuTsIDEWoRLD: THEExPERlMHwrr1FORpGN
CAPrrALISM 48 (1990). The principal "one country, two systems" is Deng's non-Marxist political ideal of
command and market economies coexisting in China. Id. Chinese leaders in 1978 announced an "open dooe
policy for foreign investment to implement China's "Four Modernizations." See Dernelle, supra note 2, at 332.
While the original idea was to accelerate the socialist regime by attracting capital and advanced technology,

the leadership now views foreign trade as necessary for a strong economy and modernized infrastructure. Id.
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Even with the development and implementation of bankruptcy legislation,24
many factors conspire against utilizing the lawfully enacted procedures. These

factors include: inaccurate analysis of a company's efficiency; the potential for
unemployment, the effect on banks and other state-run firms; and the intercon-

nection between the judiciary and the administrative arms of the government
First, because the government still controls prices, the efficiency of an
enterprise cannot necessarily be measured by its profitability.2 Consequently, an
enterprise's profitability does not necessarily reflect its viability, and shutting
down a business because of losses is illogical and inequitableY Treated similarly,
both well managed and poorly run companies with artificially depressed price
constraints do not become insolvent and thereby escape bankruptcy.? Pre-

sumably, as the market economy in China grows larger and begins to dominate,
prices will fluctuate more with the supply and demand of goods and it will be

easier to distinguish between inefficient companies and those which are well-ran.
As another factor, the potential for dislocation of workers should a firm be

liquidated hinders the proper application of the bankruptcy laws? As with any
government, the PRC is reluctant to initiate massive unemployment by declaring
a large number of enterprises bankrupt.30 Since the right to work is guaranteed

under the Communist model, the underpinnings of the entire Chinese economy
may be questioned by dislocated workers. 31 Because the workplace administers
much of the welfare system, 32 resettlement, retraining, old age pensions, unem24. Zhonghua Renmin Gongbeguo Qiye Pochanfa [Law of the People's Republic of China on
Enterprise Bankruptcy] (Nov. 1, 1988) [hereinafter Enterprise Bankruptcy Law], reprintedin 2CHINA LAWS
FOR FoRmaNBusINEss: BUSINESS REGULATIONS 113-522 (CCH Aust]. 1991); Shenzhen Jingji Tequ Shewai
Gonsi Pochan Tiaoli [Rules Concerning Bankruptcy of Foreign Related Companies in the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone] (July 1, 1987), [hereinafter Shenzhen Rules], reprintedin 1 CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN
BUSINESS: SPECIAL ZONES & CITIES 1 73-540 (CCH Austl. 1991). The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was
promulgated on December 2, 1986 and became effective November 1, 1988. Toronto, supra note 15, at 277
n.3. The Shenzhen Rules were promulgated on November 29, 1986 and became effective July 1, 1987. Id. at
277 n.5.
25. See infranotes 26-51 and accompanying text (elaborating on these factors).
26. Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got To Do With It? Legal Institutionsand Economic Reform in
China, 10 UCLA PAc. BASIN LJ. 1,51 (1991).
27. Id. For example, if a government artificially deflates or maintains prices, it reduces the earning
potential of businesses, perhaps preventing them from earning a profit. Id. Likewise, a poorly run company
appears profitable if prices are set artificially high. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Sheila Tefft, BeUing TDies to Limit Slew ofBankruptcies, CHRISTIAN Sc!. MONITOR, Aug. It,
1994, at 9.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Geoffrey Murray, China Plans to Give Teeth to Bankruptcy Law, JAPAN ECON.
NEsWIRE, Mar. 5,1995, availablein LEXIS. News Library, Jen File (explaining that the Chinese government
has rarely used the existing bankruptcy laws because of fear of "social chaos and political instability").
32. Clarke, supra note 26, at 51. "The urban population receives various welfare benefits through the
work unit such as cheap housing, special wage subsidies, ration coupons, theater tickets, vacations, health care,
child care and old age pensions:' Id. In other words, the workplace currently distributes social welfare benefits
and not a separate governmental agency.
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ployment insurance and medical insurance programs are currently inadequate to

handle large numbers of layoffs or retirements. 33 If the government applies a more

national approach to the welfare system,
the disruption due to bankruptcy and
34
lessened.
is
joblessness
consequential
Another important reason for the hesitation in liquidating insolvent businesses stems from China's banking sector? 5 Most state-owned businesses have
expanded by receiving loans from government banks. 6 Companies on the verge
of insolvency are likely to be heavily indebted 37 and large-scale bankruptcy would

simply shift the insolvency burden to the banks.38 Banks in most developed
countries maintain adequate reserves for bad debts.39 Chinese banks, however,

have maintained a very low ratio of bad debt reserves to total debt4° because the
government always ensured continued operation, and thus continued repayment

of debt.41 As a result, Chinese banks are ill equipped for a large number of
bankruptcies with derivative loan default. If the banks fail as a consequence of
such action, the Chinese economy would be in turmoil.42 In order to prepare for
a surge of bankruptcies, the government has set up a reserve fund of seven billion
yuan 43 as a guard against bad debts due to anticipated bankruptcies."

33. ProspectsforChina'sBankruptcy System Viewed, INLINTELLIGENCE REP., July 11, 1994.
34. See Mark O'Neill, China Says It Will Implement Bankruptcy Laws, REUTERS, Aug. 16, 1994.
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File (discussing reasons for not implementing the current bankruptcy laws). If welfare benefits are distributed through the workplace and the enterprise fails, the benefit is
extinguished and the government must find new work for an employee. Id. Therefore, a national unemployment
insurance or pension system would secure those benefits for a worker regardless of the health of an enterprise.

Id.
35. INT'L INlIMWGENCE REt., supranote 33; see Tony Walker, China PreparesIts Banksfor the 21st
Century, FIN. TMs, July 4, 1995 (noting that China's banking sector remains rooted in the past and while it
needs to become more responsive to the needs of a modem economy, some 20-30% of loan portfolios are "non-

performing"' due to state-run enterprises).
36. IN'LITELLIGENCE REP., supranote 33.
37. Id.
38. Bankruptcy Law Implementation Faces "Mountains of Difculties," BBC SUMMARY OF WoRLD
BROADCASTS, May 12, 1994 [hereinafter BBC SUMMARY].

39. Ir'LINTELuGENCE REP., supra note 33. Commonly, banks in developed countries keep this ratio
at 1%or more of loan assets. Id.
40. Id. In China, the ratio of bad debts to loan assets has typically been 0.1%. or 1/10 that of developed
countries. Id.
41. See Walker,supra note 35 (explaining that China's "big four" specialized banks which dominate
the banking sector-Industrial and Commercial Bank, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank and People's
Construction Bank--act like fiscal agents of government policy rather than commercial financial institutions).
But see id. (discussing a new commercial banking law, effective June 30, 1995, which gives banks legal
authority to resist interference from state officials in their lending decisions).
42. BBCSUMMARY, supra note 38. Because the money loaned comes mainly from ordinary depositors,
"if a bank also goes bankrupt, society would experience major turmoil." Id. Rather than see their debtors go
bankrupt, banks prefer to see the enterprises "indefinitely in arrears." Id.
43. As of September 1, 1995,8.32 Chinese yuan exchanged for US$1, or one yuan equaled US$0.12.
ForeignMoney, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 2, 1995, at D6. Thus, seven billion yuan represents a bad debt reserve of
approximately US$840 million.
44. ITL INTELLIGENCE REP., supranote 33.
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A similar phenomenon could extend to businesses other than banks. If one
enterprise becomes insolvent, other firms with business ties will likewise suffer
serious Iosses. 4 5 Bankruptcy on a large scale may precipitate a chain reaction of

business failure because of the interrelation of so many state-run flrms.
An overriding consideration in applying bankruptcy laws is the inter-

connection of the administrative and judicial functions of the governmentf In
bankruptcy proceedings, Chinese judges consider the relationship between the
central and local administrative authorities and the judiciary itself.48 Judges share
many of the concerns of the workers and bankers.4 9 Accordingly, the judiciary

works very closely with the central administrative agency overseeing failing

enterprises and the local authority regulating the state-controlled bank5 Judges
hesitate to apply the bankruptcy laws because the courts are not entirely independent from other sectors of the government 1

45. BBC SuMMARY, supranote 38. For example, because some enterprises dominate the processing
of local resources, their bankruptcy jeopardizes the development of local resources and impacts an entire local
economy. Id.
46. Id. " The bankruptcy of a large number of enterprises will inevitably bring about a chain reaction
because debt chains exist among all enterprises. If one enterprise goes bankrupt, other enterprises with business
relations will suffer serious losses." Id.
47. See Jurists on China's Bankruptcy Law, XINHIUA News AGENcY, Jan. I1, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Librasy, Xinhua File [hereinafterJurists] (describing the relationship between thejudiciary and
the administrative arms of the government, which has the responsibility of overseeing the operations of stateowned firms). while technically a separate branch of the government, under the Communists, until recently,
the courts existed as an arm of the central leadership (particularly when it concerns political dissidents). Marcus
W. Brauchli, Beying Eases Up: China'sNew Economy SpursLegal Reforms, Hopesfor Democracy,WALL
ST. J., June 20, 1995, at Al. The Communist Party's Central Political-Legal Committee guides the judiciary,
and every court includes a committee of seniorjudges, often party members, with reversal power. rd.
48. Jurists,supranote 47. Hu Yuin, Chief Judge of the Economic Court of Tianjin's Higher People's
Court, recognized "that it is quite different for a state-owned enterprise in China to go bankrupt than for a firm
in the western world to go bankrupt." Id.
49. Id. Judge Hu noted that "[due to historical reasons, the bankruptcy of a state-owned enterprise has
a great bearing on the interests of its workers, creditors and the state in China, especially when the relation
between the government and enterprises has not yet been streamlined and the government still has a final say
over the enterprises:' d.
50. Id. Judge Hu added, "(I]n the course of a bankruptcy and auction, thejudicial departments have to
consult with those of the administrative in resettling workers, evaluating fixed assets and land-use transfer....
For this reason, a unity of law, economy and social development must be achieved:' Id. This close working
relationship and the fact that Chinese laws grant considerable judicial leeway often result in regional
protectionism. Brauchli, supra note 47, at Al.
51. Jurists, supra note 47. In essence, judges in China regard their function in bankruptcy as a
coordinator of interests, rather than a final arbiter of disputes as they are in the United States. Id. Cf. 11 U.S.C.
§ 105 (1994) (granting the bankruptcy court broad authority to carry out, to any necessary extent, the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code). But see Brauchli, supra note 47 (noting the slow emergence of an
independent Chinesejudiciary).
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Unlike the United States53 and other developed countries, China does not uniformly apply its Bankruptcy Laws.M Two main variables affect what law is used:
how an enterprise is organized and where it is located. 55
As originally enacted, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law applies only to stateowned businesses.5 6 While this covers the vast majority of Chinese companies,
the law excludes local collective, township and cooperative enterprises, privately

owned firms, and, of more importance to Western investors, Sinb-foreign joint
ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises!Y Bankruptcy rules formulated

especially for foreign enterprises in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
govern joint ventures and foreign-owned enterprises.!8 Accordingly, if the busi-

52. In this Part, the term "insolveicy" refers to the condition whereby a debtor is unable to pay its debts
to its creditors, or, more specifically, a debtor's assets, if immediately available, do not satisfy its liabilities.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 547 (6th ed. 1990). "Bankruptcy" is the ensuing judicial process which either
distributes the assets among creditors, thereby discharging the debtor from liability, or restructures the debt.
Id. at 100. Simply put, a "liquidation" occurs when the assets of an enterprise are sold and the proceeds are
distributed among its creditors according to a set formula. Id. at 642. In the United States, this is covered in
Chapter7 of the Bankruptcy Code. IIU.S.C. § 701 et. seq. (1994). Entities and individuals may also liquidate
substantially all their assets in aChapter 11 bankruptcy. IIU.S.C. §1123 (b)(4) (1994). In a "reorganization,"
the debtor proposes to keep all its assets in exchange for a promise to pay its debts over a longer period of time.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 900 (6th ed. 1990). Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code addresses this area.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et. seq. (1994). Sole proprietors in the United States may reorganize under a Chapter 13
seq. In reorganization, the debtor and its creditors devise a "conciliation"
Bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et.
plan for paying out the owed debt. U.S. reorganization cases may convert to Chapter 7 liquidations at the
request of the debtor or by the court if in the best interest of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1994).
53. In the United States, all bankruptcy proceedings for individuals and businesses, regardless of
geographic location, fall under the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994). The
bankruptcy court constitutes a unit of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). The district court refers all
bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy judges within this unit. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994). While there are
inevitable minor variations from district to district, the bankruptcy courts all follow the procedures set forth
by the Bankruptc' Code and Bankruptcy Rules. This uniformity is not so in China; see infra notes 56-59 and
accompanying text (expanding on the differences in the application of bankruptcy law within China).
54. See supra note 12 (discussing the history of bankruptcy law in China) and note 24 (giving the names
and effective dates of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the Shenzhen Rules).
55. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (reviewing the applicability of bankruptcy laws to
business entities in China).
56. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 2; see Xiaohua, supranote 12, at 375-77 (stating
that most of the large industrial and commercial enterprises are state-owned). The law only applies to state-run
businesses because: (1) close government supervision and responsibility for poor performance makes the
enterprises inefficient, and therefore, bankruptcy provides incentive to operate more efficiently; (2) state-run
firms dominate the economy, so the law's greatest impact will be on the largest part of the economy; and (3)
since only state-owned enterprises can transfer debts to the government, a bankruptcy system will impact the
government's budget more than other forms of ownership. Id.at 376-77. But see Murray, supranote 31 (stating
that a new law will apply to all enterprises).
57. Xiaohua, supranote 12, at 376.
58. Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24. Article 2 describes which enterprises may utilize the law. Id., art.
2. See Toronto, supranote 15, at 277. For insight into the special economic zones, see KLEtNDERG, supranote
23, at 48-52; infra notes 115-127 and accompanying text.

1995 /Bankruptcy Behind the GreatWall
ness is not owned by the state or located in the Shenzhen SEZ, it is not speci-

fically covered under the bankruptcy laws of China.39
Chinese laws, including those covering bankruptcy, serve as guidelines for
the People's Courts in dispute resolution rather than as rigid binding statutes.
Consequently, they are more concise than laws in the United States3 So while
the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the Shenzhen Rules are technically only
applicable to a narrow set of circumstances, the general principles they espouse
apply, by analogy, to all businesses. 6 This Part examines the basic provisions of
the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 62 and how businesses with some component of
foreign ownership fare under the Shenzhen Rules.6 3
A. State-Owned Enterprises
Under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the bankruptcy process begins upon

the filing of a petition with the People's Court.64While either debtors or creditors
may file bankruptcy petitions, a debtor's petition requires the consent of its supervising governmental department

Voluntary bankruptcy filings by a debtor are

not considered for reorganization, unlike U.S. law which permits the debtor to
choose between reorganization and liquidation.66 Debtors are unlikely to file a

voluntary petition to liquidate because of the resultant unemployment and, if they

59. A court might apply the Shenzhen Rules by analogy outside of the SEZ. Toronto, supranote 15,
at 277. But facially the Rules only apply to foreign enterprises within the SEZ. Shenzhen Rules, supranote
24, art. 2.
60. Jonathan L. Flaxer, Bankruptcy in China, AM. BANKR. INsT.3., June 13, 1994, at 24.
61. Toronto, supranote 15, at 277. Recall that there is no case law in the Chinese civil system and,
therefore, each new case is an interpretation of the statute. Demelle, supra note 2, at 331 n.1; cf.Brauehl,
supra note 47 (indicating that in some disputes, judges follow international practices rather than just Chinese
laws because, as one judge explained, "[slometimes there are inadequate laws.:).
62. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24; see infra notes 64-113 and accompanying text (detailing
the provisions of the law).
63. Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24; see infra notes 128-153 and accompanying text (describing the
provisions of the Rules).
64. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, arts. 5,7, 8; Flaxer, supranote 60, at 24.
65. The law refers to the "higher level department in charge." Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note
24, art. 8; Flaxer, supra note 60, at 24. For state-owned businesses, government agencies control each
economic sector. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, Chinese CorporationsBulk Up to Take on the World, WALL ST.J.,
July 5, 1995, at A6 (recognizing that Sinochem, China's largest company was "[olriginally structured as a fief,
with oil and trade officials acting as its overlords....').
66. Article 17 indicates that a creditor-initiated bankruptcy may result in a reorganization. Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24,art. 17. Debtor-initiated reorganizations are not mentioned. Minor, supranote
13, at 1220. Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a debtor or creditor may file a plan for a Chapter 11
reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994). For a sole proprietor or individual under Chapter 13, only the debtor
files the plan. I1U.S.C. § 1321 (1994).
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are found to be primarily responsible for the insolvency, concomitant sanctions
to both managers and employees of the overseeing government department.67

After considering the debtor's capacity to repay debts and its payment history
to its creditors, the court will either accept or reject the case within seven days. 68
Should the court refuse to accept the case, the petitioner has ten days to appeal.69
If the court accepts a creditor's petition, the debtor is given fifteen days to respond .7 The debtor must provide the same type of information it would give if it
were filing a petition!' Once accepted, the court grants the rough equivalent to
an automatic stay. 2 However, unlike U.S. law, there is no relief from the3 stay
provision, nor is it effective before the court agrees to accept the petition.!
The court gives written notice of the case by mail to known creditors within
ten days of acceptance, and by publication to all others? 4 Creditors receiving
notification must file their claims within one month, while others have three
months from the public announcement 5 A creditor voluntarily renounces its

67. See Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 42 (describing the process whereby government
inspectors and auditors ascertain who is at fault for leading the enterprise into bankruptcy). Article 42 states
that the legal representative or the leaders of the higher level department in charge will incur "disciplinary
sanctions" should they bear responsibility for the bankruptcy. Id.; Minor, supra note 13, at 1224. If, through
neglect of duty, the party responsible causes "great loss to state property," criminal liability may be imposed
according to Article 187 of the Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,
supra note 24, art. 42. Article 187 in the Criminal Code specifies a prison sentence or forced labor up to a
period of five years. Id. at App.
68. Flaxer, supra note 60, at24.
69. Id
70. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. supranote 24, art. 10; Flaxer, supranote 60, at 24.
71. See Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 8 (outlining briefly what a debtor needs to
submit in its response to the creditor's petition for bankruptcy). It is quite similar to the information required
in a U.S. bankruptcy petition. Flaxer, supra note 60, at 24. Basically, in the United States, a petition requires
a list with the names and addresses of known creditors, a list of the equity security holders and a schedule of
assets and liabilities. See Bankruptcy Rule 1007 (setting forth lists, schedules and statements required).
72. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, arL, 11; see Minor, supranote 13, at 1223 (analogizing
the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code with respect to an automatic stay). An automatic
stay enjoins creditors from pursuing their claims, thus protecting the debtor from other collection attempts. See
11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994) (discussing the provisions for an automatic stay in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
73. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 11; Minor, supranote 13, at 1223. The Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law is therefore less accommodating to both debtors and creditors. But see 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)
(1994) (giving rationale for lifting or relieving the automatic stay under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
74. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 9; Minor, supra note 13, at 1223. Article 9 states
that a "public announcement shall be issued," but fails to indicate the medium by which notice is published.
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 9.
75. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 9. Under U.S. bankruptcy procedures, claimants
in Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings generally must file within 90 days from the first date set for the meeting
of creditors, with six narrowly drawn exceptions. See Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) (listing requirements for filing
claims in the U.S. bankruptcy system). For a Chapter 11 reorganization, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court fixes the
claims bar date. See Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) (giving requirements for filing timely claims in Chapter 11
cases).
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claim if not lodged within the time limit. 6 Interestingly, secured and unsecured
claims are filed separately;" even though it is difficult to obtain and perfect a
security interest in China?8 Property pledged to secured creditors is excluded

from the bankruptcy estate. 9 If the underlying asset is insufficient to satisfy the

debt, the remainder may be asserted as an unsecured claim.8
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law also permits creditors to initiate bankruptcy
proceedings.81 If this type of filing occurs, the supervising governmental
department may intervene within three months and request a reorganization 2

This initiates a process similar to the development of a Chapter 11 plan in U.S.
bankruptcy law.8 Once sought, the creditor must complete a reorganization
within two years." All unsecured creditors form a creditors' committee and the
court appoints a chairperson.85 As in the United States, the debtor must propose
a conciliation plan to a meeting of the creditors. 6 The conciliation agreement
must include the reasons for the insolvency, proposed improvements to management and productivity, a repayment plan and a proposal to discharge any remaining debtse The term of reorganization may not exceed two years8 8 The
creditors may approve or reject the plan. 89 If the committee agrees upon a plan,
the court suspends bankruptcy proceedings. 0 The governmental department in

charge of the debtor administers the plan.' If the plan succeeds, the reorgani-

76. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 9. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code generally bars
untimely claims, but may permit them if lodged before distribution. See 11 U.S.C. § 726a)(1) (1994)
(providing for the distribution of bankruptcy estate property).
77. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 9; Flaxer, supra note 60, at 24.
78. See Toronto, supranote 15. at 277 (discussing the lack of a registration system to publicize security
interests in China and, hence, the problems of establishing priority among secured creditors); see also Shanks,
supra note 6, at 389 (examining the undeveloped concept of security for financing in China). Because the
process of obtaining and documenting security is unclear, gaining a security interest that is enforceable is
highly problematic. Id.
79. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art 28.
80. Id.art. 28; Flaxer, supra note 60, at 24.
81. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, arts. 3, 7.
82. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 17; Minor, supranote 13, at 1221.
83. Minor, supra note 13, at 1221; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-46 (1994) (covering the administration,
formation and implementation of a reorganization under Chapter I1 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
84. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 17; Flaxer, supra note 60, at 24.
85. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. supra note 24, arts. 13,18; Flaxer, supra note 60, at 24.
86. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 18; see 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (indicating that, generally,
a debtor files a reorganization plan).
87. Flaxer supra note 60, at 24,
88. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 17.
89. rd. art. 19; see 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (discussing the acceptance of a reorganization plan under Chapter
II of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
90. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 19; Minor, supra note 13, at 1221. The court
suspends proceedings to allow execution of the plan. Id.
91. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 20.
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zation terminates the case entirely and the People's Court issues a public

announcement to that effect?'
The voting system within the creditors' committee resembles U.S. pro-

cedures: one-half of the claimants and two-thirds of the total debt represented
must approve the plan.93 A positive vote binds all members of the committee to
the agreement. 4 If the committee is unable to agree on a plan, or the debtor
subsequently abrogates the agreement, the parties may convert the reorganization

plan to a liquidation s Conversion may also occur if the business continues to
deteriorate financially, conceals or sells off assets at prices less than fair market
value, or commits other fraudulent acts. If the supervising governmental agency

declines to support a reorganization effort in the first place, or if the debtor
initiates the proceeding, the court declares a liquidating bankruptcy7

Under liquidation, the court establishes a liquidating committee consisting of
representatives of the supervising authority, government finance departments and
other professionals. 8 Notably absent is representation from workers. 99his is
surprising given the prominence of the worker in Communist ideology and the

fact that wages are given the highest priority under claims by unsecured
creditors.t

°

The liquidation committee acts as trustee and has the power to

terminate contracts; 0I recover property transferred within six months of bank-

92. Id. art. 22; Minor, supranote 13, at 1221.
93. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 16. Under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the
creditors' committee consists of all creditors. Id., art. 13. Usually the seven largest unsecured creditors
comprise the creditors' committee under U.S. bankruptcy law. I1 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994). The voting required
for approval in the United States is also one-half of the number of claimants and two-thirds of the total debt,
but these fractions apply to the entire class of creditors, not the creditors' committee. Id. § 1126(c).
94. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 16; Fiaxer, supranote 60, at 24.
95. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 21; Flaxer, supranote 60, at 24.
96. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, arts. 21,35; Flaxer, supranote 60, at 24.
97. Flaxer, supra note 60, at 24; see Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, arts. 7, 8, 23

(describing situations in which the People's Court will declare bankruptcy).
98. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 24; Minor, supra note 13, at 1222.
99. Minor, supra note 13, at 1222. Workers are involved to an extent in reorganization in that their
representative assembly is kept informed regarding the status of the plan and its opinion is "respected." Id. at
1222 n.35; see Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 20 (detailing workers involvement in the
bankruptcy process). In the United States, worker representation is neither required nor precluded, although
a creditors' committee under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code ordinarily consists of the seven largest unsecured
creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1). In China, the government has always protected workers' interests with its
"iron rice bowl" policy. Murray, supra note 31. The Bankruptcy law reflects this by authorizing the
government to re-employ the workers and to guarantee their basicliving requirements. Enterprise Bankruptcy
Law, supra note 24, art. 4. Despite this provision, it may be that workers are excluded because they would
reject any plan that closes down the enterprise and causes unemployment. For a discussion on the effects of
bankruptcy on the dislocation of workers, see supranotes 29-34 and accompanying text.
100. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 37; Minor, supranote 13, at 1224. Workers wages
rank fairly high in the U.S. priority scheme, as well. See I I U.S.C. § 507 (1994) (arranging claim priority under
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
101. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 26.
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ruptcy under certain conditions;' °2 commence civil actions on behalf of the bankruptcy estate; appraise and dispose of property; and employ appropriate personnel

to perform these functions." After the liquidation panel formulates and the
creditors' committee approves a plan for liquidation, the finalized plan is filed
with the court for confimnation.'04 If accepted, the liquidation committee executes

the plan. 105
Claim priority resembles that in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.1°6 Because the

estate does not include assets pledged as security for debt, secured creditors are
paid first to the extent that the assets satisfies their claim. 0 7 The administrative

expenses of the liquidation, including legal, management, and cost of selling,
obtain the highest priority for repayment from the remaining assets."0 8 Finally,
unpaid salaries and labor insurance premiums for the employees; taxes owed; and
unsecured creditor claims, including the unsecured portion of a partially secured
debt, on a pro rata basis all follow in order.'09
Upon successful completion of the plan, the court closes the bankruptcy'
case."0 If the court discovers within a year of concluding the proceeding that the

debtor improperly transferred property,'

it may reopen the case, recover the

property and distribute the proceeds among creditors. 2 These wrongful actions
may also result in disciplinary sanctions and criminal liability
for the legal repre13
sentative of the enterprise and other responsible parties."

102. Minor, supranote 13, at 1222; Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 35. The conditions
are: (1) concealment of assets; (2) asset distribution without any or adequate consideration; and (3)securitizing
a previously unsecured debt or pre-paying an unmatured debt. Id. Some of these conditions are similar to the
concept of "fraudulent conveyances" under U.S. law. See generally UNEF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr § I
et. seq., 7A U.L.A. 639 (1984); UNIF. FRAuDULENr CONVEYANCE ACT § I et. seq. 7A U.L.A. 427 (1918).
However, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law does not provide for recovery of pre-petition payments of unsecured
debts. Minor supra note 13, at 1222. Under U.S. law, the bankruptcy trustee may void these preferential
payments. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
103. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 24; Flaxer, supranote 60, at 24.
104. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, arts. 37-38; Minor, supranote 13, at 1223.
105. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 37; Minor, supranote 13, at 1223.
106. See Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, arts. 34, 37 (listing the priority of unsecured
claims); Cf. II U.S.C. § 507 (stating priorities of unsecured claims under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code); 11
U.S.C. § 506 (determining secured claim status).
107. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 9; Flaxer, supranote 60, at 24. See supranotes 7780 and accompanying text (examining secured claims).
108. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 34; Minor, supranote 13, at 1223.Accord 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(1).
109. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 37; Minor, supranote 13, at 1224.
110. Minor, supra note 13, at 1223; Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 38. While the
liquidation committee performs the distribution of assets, the court retains jurisdiction until all assets are gone.
rd. The liquidation group then petitions the court to conclude the bankruptcy proceedings. Id.
111. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (istlng instances of improperly transferred property).
112. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 40.
113. Id., art. 41. Article 41 states that"criminal liability will be investigated in accordance with the law,"
yet does not indicate what punishments might ensue. Id. But recall that negligence which results in serious
losses can be punished by prison or forced labor for up to five years. See supranote 67 and accompanying text
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B. Enterpriseswith ForeignInvestment in the Shenzhen SEZ
The history and development of the Shenzhen SEZ help explain why the
bankruptcy laws differ from those in other areas of China. This section briefly

explores the evolution of Shenzhen and then describes its bankruptcy laws.
1. About the Zone"

4

In the 1970s, China began to address its declining economy as contrasted

with the successes of foreign investment in other East Asian States." 5 In 1979,
the government created four Special Economic Zones where outsiders could
invest and become owners in Chinese enterprises."6 Incentives to foreigners
included tax concessions," 7 reduced land fees" and more flexible labor regulations." 9 The state intended for the zones to attract advanced technology and
capitalist expertise which could be used elsewhere in the country. "0China would
also accumulate needed foreign currency.' 2 ' The location of zones was thought
to advance political ties with other centers for foreign investment: Shenzhen, next

to Hong Kong; Zhuhai, adjacent to nearby Macao; and Xiamen, directly across
from Taiwan.'2 Shantou had close trading ties to Southeast Asia because Chinese
nationals there speak a similar dialect."2 Because of its proximity to Hong Kong
and, more importantly, the reversion of Hong Kong to China in 1997, Shenzhen
is the largest and most developed of the four zones. 24 China hopes to minimize

(discussing negligence of enterprise officials).
114. See generally KLEINBERG, supra note 23, at 47-66.
115. Id. at 47-49. Specifically, China decided that direct foreign investment was desirable. Id.
116. Id. at 4748.
117. Id. at 54. The government taxes enterprise income at a flat 15% rate, less than in other parts of
China. Id. If the business introduces advanced technology or is valued above US$5 million, the tax may be
reduced by 20% to 50%. Id.
118. KLEMNBERG, supra note 23, at 54. The authorities may grant exemptions or reduce fees by 50%,
depending on factors such as the introduction of advanced technology. Id.
119. Id.at 54-55. Differences with the rest of China include: contracts with individual employees rather
than with workers' trade unions; wage levels not set in concert with state-run firms, including wage incentives
for performance; flexibility in probation, wage reduction, and redundancy dismissals; and the right of workers

to resign. Id.
120. Id. at 47. Shenzhen instead became an entry point which allowed foreigners access to China's
internal markets, building low-technology assembly plants and creating a large service sector. Id. at 48.
121. Id. By greatly subsidizing the growth in infrastructure to support the anticipated industrial
development, the Chinese Government drained hard currency from other sectors, including agriculture. Id. This
overshadowed any gain in foreign currency. Id.
122. KLEiNBERG, supranote 23, at 51. Thegovemment particularly wished to assure Hong Kong about
its capitalist future after 1997 and, assuming success, induce negotiations with Taiwan. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 48-52. In geographic size, Shenzhen originally comprised 97% of all the SEZs and even with
expansion of the others is still 62%. Id. at 52. By 1984, Shenzhen accounted for US$580 million of the total
foreign investment in China of US$840 million. Id.Its proximity to Hong Kong gives Shenzhen access to one
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the gap in social and economic development between China and Hong Kong by
1997, and limit the flow of refugees to Hong Kong as well. as Not coincidentally,
Shenzhen has the largest number of foreign investors in China.'2 As a natural
result of the existence and growth of the zone, Shenzhen developed a bankruptcy

law for foreign related companies. 27

2. Bankruptcy of ForeignEntities in the Shenzhen SEZ
Development of the Shenzhen Rules'2 coincided with proposals for the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.' 2 9 The efforts in Shenzhen ebbed when the national
law was proposed.130 But since the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law excluded all but

state-owned businesses, Shenzhen forged ahead and developed its own rules for
foreign related enterprises.' 3 'The Guangdong Provincial People's Congress promulgated the Shenzhen rules in November 1986.3
For the Rules to apply, an enterprise must have some component of foreign
investment and be considered a legal person under Chinese Law.' 33 While pro-

of the largest consumer markets in the world. Id.
125. Ad. at 51. Roughly 480,000 people emigrated-most illegally-from China to Hong Kong between
1976 to 1981. Id. at49.
126. Toronto, supra note 15, at 277; see supra note 124 (discussing foreign investment activity in
Shenzhen).
127. Toronto, supranote 15, at 277. The legal structure in Shenzhen was developed to reassure foreign
investors. KLEINBRG, supra note 23, at 53. To supplement this framework, a special governmental unit was
created to reduce delays in approving foreign investment projects due to bureaucratic inefficiency. Id. at 56.
Much of China's foreign investment legal practices originated in Shenzhen and their slow adoption in the rest
of the country continues. Toronto, supra note 15, at 277 n.7. Because the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law only
covers state.owned businesses, the authorities in Shenzhen developed bankruptcy provisions for the foreign
enterprises within the SEZ. Id. at 277.
128. Shenzhen Rules. supranote 24.
129. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24.
130. Toronto, supra note 15, at 227. Because of the drive to construct a legal framework conducive to
foreign investors, the Rules were most likely drafted by the Shenzhen authorities before the National People's
Congress drafted the Enterprise Bankruptcy law. Id. But since the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law initially covered
foreign investment enterprises, efforts to formulate the Shenzhen Rules waned because they would be
duplicative. Id.
131. Id. at 227. Once it became clear that the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law only applied to state-owned
businesses, impetus for the Shenzhen Rules began anew. Id. For the Rules to apply, the enterprise must have
some element of foreign ownership. See infra note 133 (elaborating on the foreign ownership requirement).
132. Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24; Toronto, supranote 15, at 277.
133. Toronto, supranote 15, at 277. The Rules apply to "Sino-foreign joint equity companies, Sinoforeign co-operative companies, companies with sole foreign investment and Sino-foreign limited stock
companies established in the Special Zone." Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24, art. 2. For a description of what
constitutes a "legal person" in China, see Henry T. Zheng, Business OrganizationandSecuritiesLaws of the
People's Republicof China,43 BUs. LAW. 549, 553-57 (1988). A legal person must be lawfully established,
possess the necessary property or funds, have its own name, organizational structure and residence, and be
capable of assuming civil liability independently. Id. This is analogous to the concept in the United States of
a corporation as a separate legal entity. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1994) (defining "person" as an individual,
partnership or corporation for purposes of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).

The TransnationalLawyer/ VoL 8

cedurally similar to the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, the Shenzhen Rules differ in
some key areas on a substantive level.

Under the Shenzhen Rules, creditors and debtors may both initiate actions;
however, creditors may petition only for a liquidation bankruptcy, not a reorgani-

zation or conciliation.'3 Under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, reorganization is
only available if a creditor petition is filed, and only if requested by a supervising
government agency. 135 Further, debtors under the Shenzhen Rules may petition
for conciliation, rather than the mandatory liquidation under the Enterprise

Law.

36 Uider

the Shenzhen Rules, foreign debtors and creditors may pursue

remedies in the Shenzhen Municipal Intermediate People's Court.' 37
For an involuntary bankruptcy, a'creditor must submit to the court evidence

of its claim against the debtor along with proof that the debtor is unable to satisfy
the claim.138 If the court accepts the case for review at a formal hearing, it sets up
a liquidation committee even before a formal hearing may take place. 39 It seems
premature that the liquidation committee takes control of the enterprise prior to

the Shenzhen Rules do not
a judicial declaration of bankruptcy; nevertheless,
4°

clarify or explain this procedural inconsistency.'
At the formal hearing, the court decides whether the firm should be declared
bankrupt. 41 Upon that event, one would normally expect a stay from other
judicial proceedings against the insolvent business. 142 But unlike the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, there is no such provision in the

134. Shenzhen Rules, supra note 24, art. 7; Toronto, supra note 15, at 277.
135. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 17; see supra note 82 and accompanying text
(discussing the required permission era supervising government agency for reorganization under the Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law).
136. The Rules state that a debtor may apply for either a reorganization/conciliation or a declaration of
bankruptcy. Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24, art. 7; cf. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, arts. 7, 8,
23; supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing the lack of a conciliation process for a debtor petition
under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law).
137. Shenzhen Rules, supra note 24, art. 6. Recall that the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law concerns only
state-owned debtors. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 2; see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (detailing why only state run enterprises are covered under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law).
138. Shenzhen Rules, supra note 24, art. 8; Toronto, supra note 15, at 277.
139. Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24, art. 12; Toronto, supra note 15, at 277.
140. Toronto, supranote 15, at 277; see Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24, art. 15 (establishing the duties
of a liquidation committee, including taking operational control of the enterprise). For involuntary cases in the
United States, the Bankruptcy Court appoints a tustee-the equivalent of a liquidation committe.-only after
notice, hearing and an order for relief has been issued. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
141. Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24, art. 27.
142. In the United States, the filing of a voluntary or involuntary petition operates as a stay to further
collection avenues. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). Perhaps the main reason U.S. debtors file for bankruptcy is to gain
the benefit of the automatic stay. ROBERTLJORDAN &WtuLrAM D. WARREN, Bi NKRUnCY 26 (4th ed. 1995).
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Shenzhen Rules.1 43 Without this needed protection, the debtor is vulnerable to
claims from other creditors."4
Once a debtor is declared bankrupt, the procedures greatly resemble those in

the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. The liquidation committee meets with a
creditors' committee to evaluate their claims. 45 Secured creditors take their assets
out of the pool available for the bankruptcy estate.1t The distribution of assets
continues, with the following priority scheme: bankruptcy administrative
expenses; employee wage and insurance claims; taxes; and unsecured debt. 47

As with state-owned enterprises, a debtor under the Shenzhen Rules may
elect to file for conciliation or reorganization. 148 Supplying the same information

to the court as in a bankruptcy petition, the debtor is permitted to continue
operating if the court approves the application. 49 The court selects a liquidation
committee to oversee operations and develop a conciliation plan with the
assistance of a creditors' committee.'" Both the court and the creditors' committee must approve the plan before implementation.' Once approved, the creditors

and court may police the execution of the plan. 5 2 If not followed satisfactorily,
the court can revoke approval and bankruptcy proceedings may begin anew. 53

143. Toronto, supra note 15, at 277. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay. 11
U.S.C. § 362 (1994). The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law also provides for an automatic stay. Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24. art. 11; see supra note 72 and accompanying text (describing the automatic
stay provisions in the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law).
144. Toronto, supranote 15, at 277. Without the stay, creditors are presumably free to pursue remedies
such as repossession, foreclosure and judicial sale. Id. Because these actions are difficult to pursue, the effect
of not having a stay does not disadvantage debtors as much as it could. Id.
145. Shenzhen Rules, supra note 24, arts. 14-15.Accord Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art.
15.
146. Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24, art. 39. If the security is insufficient, the unsatisfied portion of the
debt stands as an unsecured claim. Id. Accord Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, art. 32.
147. Shenzhen Rules, supra note 24, arts. 48-49; Toronto, supra note 15, at 277. Accord Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24, arts. 34,37.
148. Shenzhen Rules, supra note 24, art. 7. A resolution from the shareholders or Board of Directors
must accompany the application, including a list of liabilities. Id. art. 8.
149. Id.art. 23; cf. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 20 (stating the state-run enterprise's
"higher level department in charge" manages the enterprise during reorganization).
150. Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24, arts. 14,20-21; cf Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, arts.
17-18 (authorizing the enterprise to submit a draft conciliation plan in consultation with its supervising governmental agency).
151. Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24, arts. 18, 25; Toronto, supranote 15, at 277. Unsecured creditors
with at least one-half of the total debt must approve the plan. Shenzhen Rules art. 18. This votfng requirement
differs from both the U.S. law and that elsewhere in China. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text
(describing voting on a reorganization plan in a creditors' committee under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
152. Shenzhen Rules, supranote 24, art. 26. Unsecured creditors with at least one-half of the debt may
vote to cancel the plan. rd.
153. rd. art.26; Toronto, supranote 15, at 277. If the creditors' committee votes to cancel the reorganization, or a creditor or the court discover some fraud committed by the enterprise in connection with the conciliation process, the court may withdraw approval of the plan and declare the enterprise bankrupt. Shenzhen
Rules, supranote 24, art. 26.
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IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE BANKRUPTCY LAW

Despite the fact that the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the Shenzhen Rules

became effective in the mid-1980s, t 4 the laws have been implemented at a very

slow pace. The factors noted in Part 11,155 creating a hesitancy on the part of the

government to declare businesses bankrupt, remain a barrier to full implementation of the bankruptcy system. Although some companies have filed for
56

bankruptcy, they are but a fraction of the enterprises which are actually failing.

Workers, banks and local governments, wary of large-scale unemployment, have
opposed the application of the bankruptcy law to insolvent businesses.'" Some

members of the central leadership do not wish to declare many state-run firms
bankrupt. 58 Ironically, this opposition and, consequently, the scant application of
bankruptcy laws has resulted in economic disruption.' 59
Notwithstanding the pressures slowing the implementation of bankruptcy
laws, there are signs China is ready to begin applying the law to declare a number

154. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was promulgated on December 2, 1986 and became effective
November 1. 1988. Toronto, supra note 15, at 277 n.3. The Shenzhen Rules were promulgated on November
29, 1986 and became effective July 1, 1987. Id.
155. See supra notes 21-51 and accompanying text.
156. Since December 1986, slightly more than 2000 Chinese firms have filed for bankruptcy. Foo Choy
Peng, supra note 7, at 5. Official estimates, however, indicate that about half of the country's 200,000 major
state-run enterprises are operating at a loss. Id. Also, the State Economic and Trade Commission released
figures showing that 41% of 72,000 state-owned businesses in the industrial sector are losing money. Id. In
1994,46 state-run businesses were declared bankrupt and closed. China to Announce Bankruptcy Law in 1996,
REuTERs, Aug. 21, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File [hereinafter Chinato Announce].
157. See O'Neill, supra note 34 (stating that because almost 20% of the loans held by China's four
largest banks are non-performing, the banking sector is an especially strong opponent of implementing the law,
since they currently do not have the reserves to cover potential losses); 'Liaowang' on Problemsof Banknuptcy
in Medium and Large State Enterprises,BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADcAsTs, May 27, 1994 (observing
that taking care of employees and finding new work for them is the most difficult problem facing state firms
after bankruptcy and that practice demonstrates that the government cannot fully resolve the dislocation of

workers).
158. O'Neill, supranote 34. Some leaders may be ideologically opposed to private enterprises and the
resultant market economy, while others, jealously guarding their state-owned firms, consider them the core of
the Chinese economy and hope to avoid accelerating the shrinking of their share of the economy. Id. See
Murray, supra note 31 (reporting that the existing bankruptcy law is subject to excessive administrative
interference and that bureaucrats regulating sectors have no desire to diminish their empires by cutting out the
under-achievers). In truth, however, development of the market economy may add to the structural
unemployment, with those out of work from state-run businesses unqualified to perform tasks in the more
competitive and technologically advanced market sector. O'Neill, supranote 34.
159. O'Neill, supranote 34. Chinese economists note that, because wages have not been paid, there have
been a number of strikes and slow downs at state-owned businesses this year. Id. As a result, millions of
workers from facilities where production has ceased are staying home and living on subsistence wages. le- The
effect of this is a high urban inflation rate of over 20%. Id. See Kathy Chen, Withering of China's State
Industries CreatesHordesof New Street Vendors, WAL ST.J., June 13, 1995 (reporting that small-scale labor
protests have become common in Shenyang and other major cities). Several hundred workers marched through
the Shenyang chanting "we want to eat" Id. In Chongqing, employees demonstrated after a laid-off factory
worker and his family committed suicide because they had no funds to buy food. Id.
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of state enterprises insolvent.L° One reason the government has reversed direction
is that bad debt reserves at banks have improved to afford stability in the face of

a large number of bankruptcies. Also, a new commercial banking law provides
the banks with greater independence from the government. 16 2 To further ease the
the government now permits foreign banks to estabpressure on Chinese banks,
163

lish branches in China.

As another improvement, the increased availability of unemployment and
health insurance diminish the disastrous effect of worker dislocation due to bank-

ruptcy.16 However, many believe that the implementation of bankruptcy must
proceed slowly to avoid instability due to joblessness. 165
In conjunction with these developments, many expect the Chinese Government to amend the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in the near future.'6 Some of the

160. See O'Neill, supra note 34 (noting that The Economic Information Daily reported that Shanghai,
Tianjin, Chongqing and Harbin, along with 14 other cities have been chosen to implement a program ofbankruptcy closures); Murray, supranote 31 (reporting that senior officials issued warnings to struggling state-run
businesses to become more efficient or face closure).
161. See Josephine Ma, Bankruptcy Law Setfor Changes, S. CMNAMORNGPOST, Oct. 7, 1994, at 9.
According to government advisor Cao Siyuan, the bad debt reserve has been increased from 0.1% of a bank's
outstanding loans to 0.6% since January 1994. Id. The Chinese Government also intends to increase the ratio
to 1%in the next few years. l. Thus, the government has effectively set aside an additional seven billion yuan
(US$841 million) forbad debts in 1994. Id.
162. See Walker, supra note 35 (noting that among the provisions in the new law is the legal authority
of banks to resist pressure from government officials to grant improvident loans); China Sets Change in
Motion, THE BANKER, June 1995 (reporting that the new law makes the banks separate legal entities, operating
independently from the government).
163. Tony Walker et al., Way is ClearedforFive Banks to Open in Beijing, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 1995.
As of March 31, 1995, foreign bank branches totaled 101, with assets of US$14 billion, an increase of 40%
over the previous year. Foreign Banking in China Grows, WAU. ST. J., June 20, 1995. Loans to Chinese
businesses grew 78% to USS8.8 billion. Id.
164. See O'Neill, supra note 34 (stating that 470,000 state-owned companies employing 74 million
workers now provide unemployment insurance, while 80% of all businesses are developing health coverage).
The rapidly growing number of companies not run by the state (private, collective and foreign) are starting their
own retirement programs because their workers are not eligible for government benefits. Id.; see also
Developments in Selected Non-OECD Countries, OECD ECON. OuTLOOK, June 1994 (noting that explicit
bankruptcy laws in other countries changing from centrally planned to market economies-Poland,
Hungary,and the Czech and Slovak Republics-have not resulted in large increases in unemployment).
165. Reform Moratoriumon Bankruptcy Experiment,XIN-mA NEwS AGENCY, July 7, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File [hereinafterReform Moratorium].
166. See Ma, supranote 161 (quoting bankruptcy expert and government advisor Cao Siyuan, who was
instrumental in drafting the original Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, as saying that he expected the amended draft
to be approved at the next meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress); Drafting
for New Bankruptcy Law Nears Completion, XIA NEws AGENCY, Aug. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Xinhua File [hereinafter Drafting] (noting that the Financial and Economic Committee of the
National People's Congress expects to complete a draft of the new bankruptcy law by early 1996). The new
law constitutes part of a wave of legal reforms sweeping China. See Brauchli, supra note 47 (noting that a
primary rationale for the legal changes is to reassure investors about their interests with a strong commercial
code); but see Reform Moratorium, supra note 165 (quoting the State Commission for Restructuring the
Economy as stating that bankruptcy reform would be postponed because of China's underdeveloped social
welfare system).
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main revisions include: extending the reach of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law to
all enterprises, notwithstanding the type of ownership; allowing non-governmental entities to effectuate post-bankruptcy assessment functions; shortening the
timetable for bankruptcy procedures; and clearly defining bankruptcy terms and
penalties for violating procedures.1 67 Perhaps the most important new provision
will sever the judicial function in bankruptcies from the government administrative agencies.a These amendments, along with a renewed effort to apply bank-

ruptcy law, should improve competitiveness in enterprises which are currently
suffering losses.' 69 Also, while fear of massive unemployment remains high, the
Chinese Government expects that only a small portion of state-owned enterprises
will actually fail as a result of applying the law because most of the firms currently operating at a loss are strong enough to survive.

As an encouraging step in the effort to implement bankruptcy laws, the
government, utilizing the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, recently auctioned a major
state-owned brewery in Tianjin, the largest port city in North China.!71 While
creditors only recovered approximately ten percent of their stake, they were
apparently satisfied with the legal procedures. 72 The Chinese Government,
73

viewing success of this auction may allow other state-run finns to go bankrupt.

167. See China to Issue New EnterpriseBankruptcy Law, XINHUA News AGENCY, Dec. 29, 1994,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; Ma, supranote 161 (describing the changes to the bankruptcy
law).
168. The new law explicitly defines the relationship between government, the enterprise and the courts.
Drafting,supranote 166. The law stipulates that the government may not interfere in bankruptcy proceedings.
Id.; China to Announce, supranote 156; see Chinato PassNew Bankruptcy Law Next Year, AG EN CE FRANCE
PRESSE, Aug. 21, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Afper File [hereinafter China to Pass](noting that
the new law prohibits official departments from intervening in bankruptcy procedures). The bankruptcy reform
is just part of a drive towards an increasingly independent judiciary. See Brauchli, supranote 47 (observing

that reversals by seniorjudges with significant ties to the Communist party are becoming rare, and that many
Chinese leaders, who were victims of extrajudicial prosecution during the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution,
favor the establishment of an independent court system).
169. Ma, supra note 161; see Murray, supranote 31 (reporting that senior government officials have
warned state-run businesses that they will face closure under the new bankruptcy law and that they should take
immediate steps to become more efficient).
170. Ma, supra note 161. Advisor Cao estimates 10% of state enterprises operating at a loss would be
dissolved in bankruptcy. Id. He predicts that only 700,000 workers would lose their jobs, dismissing fears of
widespread unemployment. Id.
171. Jurists, supranote 47. On January 10, 1995, the brewery with more than 600 workers, fixed assets
of 89 million yuan (US$10.7 million), but reportedly in debt 183 million yuan (US$22 million), was sold to
a Sino-foreign joint venture for 54 million yuan (US$6.5 million). Id. See Foreign Money, supranote 43, at
D6 for exchange rate. The sale of the brewery was Tianjin's third bankruptcy case and the largest, in terms of
fixed assets, in China to date. Jurists, supranote 47.
172. Jurists, supra note 47. It is significant that the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was utilized in this
instance and that the creditors agreed to abide by the procedure rather than expect a supervising government
agency to intervene and pay off the debts. Id.
173. See, e.g., Toronto, supra note 15, at 277, n.94 (reporting the declaration of bankruptcy of the
Nanchang Motorcycle Factory in Jiangxi Province on December 7, 1989); Chen, supranote 159 (noting that
government authorities are now more inclined to allow state-owned enterprises to go bankrupt).
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However, it remains to be seen if this rejuvenated effort to implement bankruptcy
law in China will overcome the resistance of workers, the banking sector, and
elements of the government itself. 74
V. SUGGESTED STRATEGIES
The structure and enforcement of the bankruptcy laws suggest several

strategies. These include: maintaining a good relationship with a state-owned
business' supervising governmental department; securing debt when possible;
working around stay provisions; arguing that the court apply international bank-

ruptcy practices
if the Chinese law is too vague; and acquiring businesses at bart75
gain prices.
If a U.S. business is a creditor to a state-owned enterprise, t76 it is imperative
to maintain a positive working relationship with the debtor's supervising govern-

mental agency. 17 Because conciliation is usually preferable to liquidation 17 and
since the government department must decide whether to support a reorganization

petition submitted by the debtor, the government's support in a decision to reorganize or liquidate is crucial.179 To avoid the disruption caused by the loss of
jobs, the government agency may more readily support conciliation'

0

While true in almost any bankruptcy regime, securitizing any debt gives an
advantage to a U.S. business in the position of creditor. This is true in China
because under either the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law or Shenzhen Rules, secured
creditors sit in a preferential situation 81 However, it is difficult to register a

174. Note the conflicting reports that the bankruptcy reform efforts continue. Compare Reform
Moratorium, supra note 165 (stating that "bankruptcy will be postponed in this year's reform of state-owned
enterprises) with China toAnnounce, supranote 156 (relating that the new law is expected to be promulgated
in 1996).
175. See infra notes 176-191 and accompanying text (elaborating on the strategies).
176. See, eg., supranote 9 and accompanying text (explaining how some U.S. businesses could become
creditors).
177. Recall that the higher level department in charge must intervene to request a reorganization.
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supranote 24,art. 17.
178. A creditor or owner of an enterprise favors the course of action -liquidation or reorganizationwhich promises the highest return. J. FRED WESON & EUGME F. BRIGcHAM, MANAGIERAL FINANCE 900 (6th
ed. 1978). Frequently, a firm is more valuable as a going concern compared to the sum of its liquidated
component assets. Id.
179. Also, from the government's point of view, recall that in a liquidation, the government is responsible for finding new employment for the workers. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 4.
180. A policy decision to encourage conciliation rather than liquidation surrounded passage of the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. Toronto, supranote 15, at 277. Fear of losing jobs and worker opposition remains
one of the reasons bankruptcy laws have not been fully implemented. See, e.g., O'Neill, supra note 34 (stating
reasons for lack of implementation).
181. Recall that the bankruptcy estate does not include debt secured by assets. See supra notes 77-80,
107, 146 and accompanying text (assessing secured debt under Chinese bankruptcy laws).
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security interest, so a U.S. business should balance the costs in obtaining the
interest with the lower risk associated with an improved priority position.'8
The existence or lack of stay provisions in the two sets of laws suggest
different paths, depending on whether one is a debtor or creditor.'8 If dealing
with a state-run business under the Enterprise Law, which has a stay provision,
negotiation with the firm before petitioning as a creditor for an involuntary
bankruptcy would seem appropriate.'" As a creditor under the Shenzhen Rules,
one can pursue legal remedies even after a declaration of bankruptcy because of
the lack of an automatic stay.' s This could be problematic, however, if one were
to enter into a joint venture or own outright a concern in Shenzhen and be in the
position of debtor, as declaring bankruptcy would not provide protection from
creditors. 6 This issue becomes superfluous if the new bankruptcy law takes
effect, because the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law would then apply to all enterprises, state run, private or foreign owned. 187
If a U.S. business should find the applicable bankruptcy law inadequate, it
might argue before a people's court to apply international standards of practice. 188
Judges may be more receptive to this proposal because of the increasing
independence of the judiciary from other arms of the government.18 9
Even the continuing reluctance of the Chinese Government to close down
insolvent businesses could present business opportunities to investors from
outside China.'9 Already, investor groups from within China and from abroad
have acquired businesses and land at bargain prices.! '

182. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (describing the problems associated with perfecting a

security interest in China).
183. The automatic stay benefits a debtor and disadvantages a creditor by halting all collection

proceedings by creditors against debtors. See supra note 72 (describing the automatic stay in the Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
184. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 24, art. 11.
185. See supranotes 142-144 (examining the lack of an automatic stay under the Shenzhen Rules).

186. See supranote 144 (detailing the extra-judicial actions a creditor may pursue against a debtor).
187. See, eg., China to Pass,supra note 168 (listing the changes in the new bankruptcy law, including
its application to all kinds of enterprises).
188. See Brauchli, supra note 47 (noting that judges in futures trading disputes have followed inter-

national practices because the Chinese laws were too vague).
189. See supranote 168 and accompanying text (noting the emergence of ajudiciary independent from
the administrative arm of the government, especially in bankruptcy procedures).
190. See Murray, supra note 31 (observing that many current merger and acquisition regulations assist
foreign investors in acquiring small scale state-owned enterprises). The methods used range from establishing
joint ventures to a complete stock buy out of the loss-making firms. Id.
191. For example, an ailing beverage factory in Xinle tried in vain for over a year to be taken over by
the Haomen Group from Yutian. Tefft, supra note 29, at 9. When plans for a new airport near Xinle were
announced, the thirty acres of real estate proved too tempting for Haomen. Id. Also, in Sichuan, the provincial
government announced in April 1994. that, after two unsuccessful attempts, it would negotiate a deal with
foreign investors for33 firms specializing in electronics, metallurgy, machinery and pharmaceuticals. IfL These
companies were worth more than US$400 million in assets and had 77,000 workers. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy laws in China continue to evolve. As U.S. businesses

consider whether or not to invest in the potentially lucrative Chinese market, they
need to keep abreast of the changing legal climate in the PRC.' 92 Other considerations include the effect of proposed modifications to existing bankruptcy
law193 and the government's success in actually applying bankruptcy over the
ever-present reluctance of workers,' 94 bankers 95 and entrenched government

officials. 196
The U.S. Government will, most certainly, continue to encourage U.S.

businesses to invest in emerging markets. 97 China, one of the world's largest
markets, seems especially lucrative given its growth in demand for consumer

goods. 98 Opportunities to participate in and profit from China's growing
economy
9 grow more competitive, particularly with investors already located in
Asia.'"

For investment managers analyzing markets, a country's legal system determines the attractiveness of an investment, along with peculiarities of its national

economy.2 ° One such consideration entails the protections offered to debtors and
creditors under bankruptcy law. 20' The Chinese bankruptcy laws in their current

state are vague and underutilized, and it remains to be seen whether proposed
changes will provide incentives for attracting more foreign investment.
Steven L. Seebach

192. See Brauchli, supranote 47 (reporting the numerous legal reforms sweeping China). As a result of
the new laws, commercial litigation has grown rapidly, resulting in a recruitment drive for new attorneys. Id.
41 foreign law firms have opened offices in China. Id.
193. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text (describing proposed changes to China's
bankruptcy laws).
194. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (assessing the negative effects of bankruptcy on
workers). But see supra note 164 and accompanying text (describing improvements in the social welfare
system which may blunt some of the criticism by workers).
195. See supra notes 36.45 and accompanying text (explaining the reluctance of banks to allow
widespread bankruptcy); but see supranotes 161-163 (listing reasons for banks current improved position,
which makes them better able to survive of bankruptcies wave).
196. See supranote 158 and accompanying text (describing the opposition of government officials to
the application of bankruptcy proceedings).
197. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (noting the recent growth of foreign investment in
China and affirming the Clinton Administration's goals in directing foreign investment).
198. See supranote l and accompanying text (emphasizing the potential for U.S. investors in China).
199. See Brauchli, supranote 2 (describing the growth in foreign investment in China, especially from
its neighbors in Asia and the importance of the Chinese market to the United States).
200. Breeden, supra note 7.
201. Id.

